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We  analyze  the  acquaintances  of  a  sample  of academic  inventors  and  their  paired  controls  to  investigate
the contribution  of  social  networks  to the  generation  of  inventive  ideas  in  academe.  Prior  to  patenting,
inventors  work  in  networks  of similar  dimension  and  structure  as  those  of  their  colleagues  who  do  not
invent.  The  ego-networks  of  the  inventors  are  however  more  cohesive  (denser),  a  circumstance  that  is
often  seen  as  associated  to the  exchange  of  more  ﬁne-grained  information  and  to  a  greater  climate  of
trust which  facilitates  long-term  relationships  and  learning.  Over  time,  both  inventors  and  non-inventorseywords:
cademic patenting
ocial networks
nowledge generation
rokerage
ohesive networks
extend  their  networks  and  become  more  central.  In general,  we  found  no  evidence  that  after  patenting
inventors  isolate  or close  their  networks.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.echnology transfer
. Introduction
In recent years academic patenting has become the subject
f extensive academic investigation (Baldini et al., 2006, 2007;
tephan et al., 2007; Azoulay et al., 2007, 2009; Calderini et al., 2007,
009; Fabrizio and Di Minin, 2008; Breschi et al., 2008; Crespi et al.,
011). In this paper we contribute to this debate by investigating
he social network dimension behind academic inventorship (Allen,
977; Etzkowitz, 1983; Balconi et al., 2004; Murray, 2004; Lissoni,
010). The hypotheses that underlie this paper are grounded on
he theories of socially constructed knowledge and on the power
f weak ties (Granovetter, 1983; Lee, 2009). Networks channel the
nowledge and information that each scientist receives and recom-
ines into their research. The accomplishments of a scientist are
herefore affected by the power of their network to convey rich
nformation. Networks that are larger in size, keeping all other
hings constant, convey more ideas to exploit, more complemen-
ary knowledge to make research successful and a larger group
f supporters of one’s own ideas (Sobrero, 2000; Lissoni, 2010).
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048-7333 © 2013 Elsevier B.V. 
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.05.003
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Networks with denser or sparser nodes convey information of dif-
ferent quality and individuals may  be more or less capable to beneﬁt
from this information, depending on the position they occupy
within the network (Phelps et al., 2012).
The knowledge network of academic scientists can be investi-
gated by means of co-authorship in articles. The large incidence of
homonyms in publication databases, however, creates data relia-
bility issues, since the number of records in need of name-matching
scales up at the power law for social network analysis purposes. To
the best of the authors’ knowledge our work is unique in its kind
because it takes advantage of recent developments in name disam-
biguation techniques to ensure reliability of the publication data.
Thanks to cooperation with Elsevier–Scopus, we could perform
a network analysis based on 9997 authors of 283,280 scientiﬁc
articles with reasonable certainty of very limited homonyms bias.
The analysis offered herein investigates the potential impact of
patented inventions on the network’s structure and the ego’s posi-
tion within the network by comparing pre-event measures across
inventors and controls. This comparison allows us to speculate on
the characteristics of networks that are associated to the inventive
activity. The latter part of the analysis is also relevant to uncov-
ering potentially changing patterns of collaboration behaviour in
the aftermath of academic patenting. In principle, closer prox-
imity to the exploitation realm may  alter the role of academic
inventors within their scientiﬁc community, making them more
secluded and distant from their non-patenting peers (Toole and
Czarnitzki, 2010). For example, they may  become more prone to
relying on closer and more independent relational sets, ultimately
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iminishing the overall social returns of their scientiﬁc discov-
ry. Conversely, the inventive activity may  stimulate new interests
nd/or expand and diversify their networks of co-authors in direc-
ions that comprise a more variegated setting.
The analysis is useful also to help disentangle team size effects
rom network effects. Prior works have taken team size (given
y the average number of co-authors) into account, and found
hat inventors generally work in larger groups than non-inventors
Czarnitzki et al., 2009). Here we distinguish between individuals
ho repeatedly work with a large team and individuals who coop-
rate with many diverse co-authors in different studies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we  develop the
ypotheses that will drive the empirical investigation. In Section 3,
e describe the research design, the dataset, the matching proce-
ure used to create the paired samples and the measures of social
etworks used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical
vidence and discusses the results. We  conclude by highlighting
he contributions of our paper and some open questions for future
esearch in Section 5.
. Academic patenting and social network effects
.1. Explaining the research accomplishments of academic
nventors
We  have learned from recent works on academic patenting that
nventors represent a small share of the population of academics.
ven in the subﬁelds in which patenting is relatively common,
ike biotech and chemistry academic inventors never seem to
xceed 10–15% of the scholars (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002;
reschi et al., 2008). Several works have also consistently shown
hat the most productive and accomplished individuals in science
re overrepresented within the sample of academic inventors
Fabrizio and Di Minin, 2008; Stephan et al., 2007). Furthermore,
hen data is analyzed on a longitudinal timespan, patents seem
o be preceded by a burst of publications (Azoulay et al., 2007;
alderini et al., 2007) and tend to boost productivity in the years
mmediately after patenting (Azoulay et al., 2009; Breschi et al.,
008; Calderini et al., 2009).
The fact that a few productive authors in science are dispro-
ortionally responsible for a large share of the publications has
een well documented since the early ’60s (de Solla Price, 1963;
llison and Stewart, 1974). Still, it is at ﬁrst counterintuitive that an
ven smaller proportion of scholars seems to be capable of simul-
aneously producing advances in the scientiﬁc understanding of
rinciples, phenomena and new technologies suitable for industrial
pplication.
This circumstance has raised a question about what capabili-
ies form the basis of academic patenting and if there are common
rivers that explain the success of a scientist in the academic and
ndustrial worlds. Although in the traditional view of science as a
peculative activity, scientiﬁc inquiry and practical application are
een as antonyms, at a closer look several considerations suggest
hat this vision is oversimpliﬁed and obscures the true nature of
esearch. Scholars have suggested multiple potential explanations
or the positive correlation between publications and patents.
First, there are areas of investigation (the so-called “Pasteur’s
uadrant”) in which fundamental understanding and practical
pplications can be pursued at the same time and other areas of
nvestigation in which this is not the case (Stokes, 1997). In the ﬁrst
ase, the pursuit of scientiﬁc and technological goals can be com-
ined, and the two activities can generate positive feedback for one
nother. This happened for instance in the early years of biotech-
ology, when many eminent scientists became famous for their
echnological advances while maintaining a leading position in sci-
nce (see, for instance, Zucker et al., 1998; Davies, 2001; Feldman 42 (2013) 1378– 1388 1379
et al., 2005). A ﬁrst possible explanation for the correlation between
scientiﬁc and technical achievements is that we are observing areas
in which the trade-off is less severe.
Second, success in research often requires the solution of tech-
nical problems that constrain scientiﬁc investigation. Scholars who
study the creativity of scientists maintain that the rate-limiting
factor for progress in science is not the pace at which new ideas
come to researchers but the pace at which those ideas can be
transformed into feasible operations on the bench (Holmes, 2004).
Since a large proportion of the inventions that academic scien-
tists produce relate to improved research technologies, the event of
producing a patent precedes success in research (Franzoni, 2009).
Third, successful scientists are often described as individuals
who  are entrepreneurial by nature (Allen, 1977; Etzkowitz, 1983).
Success in science requires extensive organizational skills as well
as the capacity to raise funds to support a line of research. This is
especially true in recent years, as proven by the steadily increas-
ing sizes of research teams (Adams et al., 2005; Wuchty et al.,
2007) and the enlarged budgets that need to equip fully functional
research labs (Stephan, 2012). A successful scientist needs to be
skilled at envisioning funding opportunities, establishing collab-
orations, brokering research scope and uncovering market needs.
These abilities are also likely to underlie success in developing tech-
nologies for the market (Murray, 2004; Baldini et al., 2007; Franzoni
and Lissoni, 2009).
2.2. The effect of social networks on inventive activities
In this paper we  investigate the social network of inventors –
prior and after patenting – in search of explanations for why  sci-
entiﬁc and market achievements are correlated. This explanation
is grounded on the theory of socially constructed knowledge and
hypothesizes that a larger and richer social network is the basis for
superior performance by scientists in both research and inventive
accomplishments.
Extensive studies on social network theory have emphasized the
relevance of the social network dimension in the creation and dif-
fusion of knowledge (Coleman, 1988; Freeman, 1991; Ahuja, 2000).
The importance of relational capital depends on the circumstance
that knowledge is only partially codiﬁable and remains largely tacit
and bound to individuals (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This highlights
the importance of face-to-face (or somehow socially-channelled)
collaborations to enable the circulation and exchange of novel ideas
in research. The characteristics and structure of the network of col-
laborations in which a person works and the position of a speciﬁc
node within the network should therefore concur to explain the
extent to which a single node would be productive of new ideas,
such as those leading to innovation (Sobrero, 2000; Nerkar and
Paruchuri, 2005).
In this section, we build on the contributions of the literature to
formulate hypotheses regarding the correlation between a num-
ber of characteristics of one person’s network and her propensity
to produce inventions. We  focus on three elements: (i) network
dimension; (ii) network position; and (iii) ego-network structure
building hypotheses on how these features of relational capital may
be associated to a greater propensity to become inventors.
Network dimension (size). Based on the theory of knowledge
recombination, each individual at a given moment owns a certain
endowment of knowledge accumulated during prior experience.
When individuals interact with other individuals (for example they
co-author a work), they exchange and recombine their respec-
tive knowledge sets, producing new combinations. Knowledge
recombination may  not always be easy or successful but when
a successful recombination occurs, this generates a novel idea,
solution or insight (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Fleming, 2001;
Murray and O’Mahony, 2007). Collaboration enables a faster pace
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f progress because it is not constrained by the speed of individual
earning. Furthermore, the recombination of a network’s knowl-
dge generates more chances to produce creative results than
he recombination of a single individual’s knowledge, because the
ontribution of each person is different. Scholars who  work on cre-
tivity in science have proposed a theory of chance and creativity,
alled Chance Combination Theory, which helps us to explicate this
ssue (Simonton, 2004). According to this theory, creativity results
rom the ability of the scientist to associate and combine pieces of
nowledge and information in ways that are both original (never
ried before) and useful. The probability of a successful combination
s tiny and cannot be foreseen in advance, but it increases with the
umber of times that novel combinations are tried. If we  consider
eople to be repositories of idiosyncratic and tacit knowledge, and
o-authorship as the link through which knowledge travels from
ne individual to another, the number of unique combinations that
ach individual can make increases with the pool of knowledge
hat she can access and hence with the size of her network (Perry-
mith and Shalley, 2003). Several studies have conﬁrmed this idea,
or example, by ﬁnding positive correlations between the size of
 research team and various indicators of the quantity and quality
f its publications (De Beaver and Rosen, 1979; Kretschmer, 2004;
efazio et al., 2009).
A second argument suggesting a positive correlation between
he extent to which a scientist relies on a broad relational capital
nd her productivity relates to the internal approach to the world of
cience, which was extensively explored by Robert K. Merton and
olleagues (see for instance Merton, 1957; Hagstrom, 1965). Sci-
ntiﬁc theories and ﬁndings, especially new and disruptive ones,
pread out and become afﬁrmed when they are known, discussed
nd agreed upon by the scholarly community. Therefore, numerous
nd frequent relationships with a large community of colleagues
avour the acceptance of a scholar’s work (Allen, 1977), while iso-
ation reduces the probability of success.
Both of these arguments – that relational capital supports the
eneration of new ideas, as well as their diffusion and acceptance –
ead us to expect a positive correlation between the size of the social
etwork to which the scientist has access and success in inventive
ctivities. Individuals who are working in larger networks should
herefore be more likely to generate new ideas, simply because
arger networks have greater capacity to convey more numerous
nformation, all other things being equal. Our Hypothesis 1 will
herefore be as follows:
1 (:).  Inventors should be found in larger proportions among
cientists with larger networks.
Network position (centrality and brokerage).  The nodes that com-
ose a network can be characterized in terms of their position.
ne prominent feature of a node position relates to how essen-
ial it is for connecting the other nodes of a network. This property
s captured by network centrality. Nodes connecting otherwise
isconnected individuals are more critical to convey informa-
ion exchange. Scholars of social network theory have maintained
hat nodes in more central positions have not only more direct
ies (hence more occasion to get ﬁrst-hand information), but also
njoy controlling privileges over valuable information exchanged
y their acquaintances (Nerkar and Paruchuri, 2005). Bridges are
rucial to enable knowledge transmission throughout the entire
etwork and consequently enjoy a higher status by virtue of their
osition (Langlois, 1977; Burt, 1992). In social network analysis,
ndividuals who are central in their network, not only provide
eans to connect individuals, but also make the connection thathey bring less redundant with respect to all other connections.
s a consequence, they should exhibit a comparative advan-
age over less central individuals. In this paper, consistently with
rior studies (Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Nerkar and Paruchuri, 42 (2013) 1378– 1388
2005; Lee, 2009) we  are interested in investigating whether
the brokering position of a scholar associates with inventive
behaviour.
In general, a brokerage position is assumed to enhance the
capability to generate fresh knowledge (Audia and Goncalo, 2007;
McFadyen and Cannella, 2004). The relationship may  not nec-
essarily be linear, as diseconomies may emerge when networks
grow very large (McFadyen and Cannella, 2004). However, for the
relatively limited size that characterizes scientiﬁc co-authorship
networks, we  can formulate the following:
H2 (:).  Inventors should be found in larger proportions among
scientists that lay in central and brokering positions.
Ego-network structure (density and constraint).  The predictions of
the literature concerning the link between knowledge generation
and dimension and network position are quite straightforward. In
contrast, social network scholars have for long been divided con-
cerning whether ego-networks in which individuals interact more
intensely and repeatedly are more or less useful for knowledge gen-
eration than ego-networks with less redundant links and structural
holes (Phelps et al., 2012). More cohesive networks, where individ-
uals are more interdependent and share the same acquaintances,
increase trust, permit to build a reputation and enable a more
ﬁne-grained diffusion of knowledge (Reagans and McEvily, 2003).
However, when individuals continue to interact with the same
group of people, they are prone to receiving the same information
several times (Burt, 1992; Lee, 2009). Intuitively, redundant infor-
mation is less relevant than fresh information and exhausts creative
power. Conversely, weak ties and sparser connections might bring
novel, non-redundant information (Granovetter, 1983; Nahapiet
and Ghoshal, 1998).
Some scholars proposed a contingency view of ego-networks,
suggesting that different types are more useful for certain tasks
than for others. Because high cohesion supports productivity and
trust – and is therefore important to exchange detailed or highly
sensitive knowledge – dense networks function better in sustain-
ing learning processes (Morgan and Sørensen, 1999). Cohesion
may  also promote an easier spread and adoption of new ideas
(Fleming et al., 2007). Conversely, weak ties bring in more diver-
sity and tend to function better in sustaining creative processes
(Uzzi et al., 2007), because individuals with very diverse endow-
ments have more chances of producing novel, non-duplicative
combinations (Perry-Smith and Shalley, 2003; Uzzi and Spiro,
2005).
Some scholars have suggested that the degree to which the
external environment is stable serves as a moderating factor. For
example, Rowley et al. (2000) study alliance networks in the steel
and semiconductor industries and ﬁnd that high density is more
important in relatively stable competitive markets, while weak ties
would be more advantageous in uncertain environments. Given
that the predictions of the literature are inconclusive, we formulate
two  mutually exclusive hypotheses.
H3a (:).  Denser and less constrained networks promote the
exchange of ﬁner-grained information and more effective learning
and would be associated to greater propensity to invent.
H3b (:).  Sparser (less dense) and more constrained networks foster
creative processes and would be associated to greater propensity
to invent.
2.3. The impact of inventive activities on scientists’ networksA ﬁnal issue we  want to explore in our analysis relates to the
participation of academic inventors in networks and communi-
ties in the post-invention period. A very rich debate has ﬂourished
in the last decade about the positive and negative implications of
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naire distributed to Italian academic scholars (Baldini, 2004). This
gave us a sample of 85 non-inventors in the ﬁeld of Chemistry for
drawing matched pairs.5
4 All Italian professors are afﬁliated with a unique subﬁeld within the clas-
siﬁcation of the Italian Ministry of University and Research. The list of classes
(http://www.miur.it/UserFiles/116.htm) and the professors afﬁliated with them
(http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php) is publicly available. This
data  are updated on a yearly basis and our study is based on professors listed at the
time of data collection.
5 We have no reason to believe that our controls could have had any motivation
to  avoid reporting patenting activity. Therefore, we are conﬁdent that they didn’t
become inventors within or before the observation window. It is important however
to  note that the control and the treated may  have partially overlapping networks,E. Forti et al. / Research
avouring the patenting activities of academic scholars. A summary
f this extensive debate would exceed the scope of this paper.3
ere, we limit our discussion to recalling that isolation in secluded
cholarly communities has been reported among the potential risks
ssociated with excess attention for research commercialization of
cademic scientists (Toole and Czarnitzki, 2010).
In this paper, we contribute to this debate by investigating the
tructure of the social network and the respective position of aca-
emic inventors ﬁve years after patenting. To highlight variations,
e compare network indicators before and after the invention. In
rder to account for potentially confounding factors posed by life
ycle effects (e.g., networks tend to grow as the scientist ages, then
evel-off towards the end of the career), we further look at com-
arable indicators computed for a matched colleague, paired as a
ontrol.
If academic inventors become more prone to isolate themselves
rom the academic community in order to pursue commercial
esearch, then we should observe deterioration in their networks
long the different dimensions highlighted above.
4a. Smaller networks or less central or brokering positions
fter patenting may  indicate that academic inventors become more
ecluded from the scientiﬁc community after patenting.
4b. Larger networks and more central or brokering positions
fter patenting may  support the view that inventions do not under-
ine the capacity/willingness of the scientist to interact with the
cademic world.
In addition, or in combination to the previous, we would be
nterested to observe whether the ego-network structure (density
nd constraint) of an academic inventor changes after patenting. As
entioned earlier we do not have a unique prediction as of which
tructure would be more desirable. Consequently, it would be dif-
cult to tell ex-ante which speciﬁc change should be regarded as
n improvement or rather a deterioration. Accordingly, we  pro-
ose two alternative hypotheses, each subordinated to whether
n the pre-invention period we had found conﬁrmation to H3a or
3b. If H3a is conﬁrmed, then we will investigate the following
ypothesis:
5a. Less dense and more constrained networks after patenting
ay  indicate that academic inventors lose part of the knowledge
eneration capacity of their network in the post-invention phase.
Conversely, if 3b is conﬁrmed, then we will investigate the fol-
owing hypothesis:
5b (:).  More dense and less constrained networks after patenting
ay  indicate that academic inventors lose part of the knowl-
dge generation capacity of their network in the post-invention
hase.
. Research design
We  investigate whether differences in the network structure
nd position of scientists are individual-speciﬁc and ﬁxed, or if
hey change over time. By including the time dimension, we  also
sk whether the circumstance of being inventive contributes to
lterations in the network and the inventor’s position within it.
mpirically, answering this question requires addressing the issue
f time-varying confounding factors. Typically, as for all scientiﬁc
ndicators, the most relevant of these confounding factors is the
ife-cycle (or career age) effect.
Productivity is in fact known to grow (more than linearly)
hroughout most of a scientist’s career but generally declines in
3 See for example Siegel and Wright (2007) for a review. 42 (2013) 1378– 1388 1381
the last years (Levin and Stephan, 1991). Therefore, when compar-
ing scientiﬁc achievements before and after a speciﬁc year (e.g.,
the year of the invention), there is a general tendency to register
growth. Problems arise in determining to what extent this ten-
dency is to be attributed to merely the effects of time rather than to
the event of interest. Difference-in-differences methods have been
shown as an effective strategy to address issues of spurious correla-
tion (Bertrand et al., 2004). Accordingly, we  control for the life-cycle
dependence and other confounding factors by assessing differences
in network characteristics and positions across matched pairs of
scientists with similar confounding factors.
3.1. Data
Studies on the communities of scientists often highlight pro-
found international differences in the scientiﬁc labour markets as
well as differences among academic institutions operating in the
same country (Bonaccorsi and Dario, 2007; Czarnitzki et al., 2009;
Lee, 2009). To avoid potential interference of institutional factors,
we focus on one single country, Italy, with a homogeneous uni-
versity system and homogeneous training, hiring and promotion
practices during the time of observation. We  begin by building a
sample of academic inventors and sample of academic scholars who
did not invent.
Academic inventors were identiﬁed using the Patiris database
(Forti and Sobrero, 2013), which includes all patent applications by
Italian universities, ﬁled nationally and abroad, both directly or as
extensions of patents ﬁled elsewhere. This database includes all of
the inventors appearing in patents ﬁled by a university or national
research agency based in Italy. However, it does not include all
Italian academic inventors, as many academic inventors have ﬁled
patents with companies or under their own name, given the aca-
demic privilege that was  in force during most of the timespan
considered (Balconi et al., 2004). We  will keep this in mind when
interpreting the results.
To avoid disciplinary differences, we focused exclusively on
the ﬁeld of Chemistry.4 This restricts the sample to 59 inven-
tors between 1982 and 2006. Patent incidence is consistent
to those found in other independent studies (Breschi et al.,
2008).
Controls were taken from the population of Italian chemists who
did not appear among the inventors of academic patents. To ensure
that these scholars had never been inventors of patents assigned to
other institutions or individuals, we further restricted the sample
to those who explicitly denied patenting experience in a question-thus potentially causing indirect treatment on the controls via their network. In
terms of magnitude the incidence of network overlap at the second level of acquain-
tances is however very limited. Considering the whole set of papers co-authored by
inventors and non-inventors and their co-authors, we  found that 0.02% of all arti-
cles published during their entire career overlapped to some extent. We appreciate
the comments of an anonymous reviewer in suggesting that we clarify this point in
explaining our use of the data.
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.2. Matching procedure
We  run a pair matching procedure starting with 144 scientists:
9 academic inventors and 85 academic scholars who did not hold
nventions. We  regarded the event of becoming an inventor as a
treatment” and held the non-inventors as “untreated” individuals
o serve as controls. The observable pre-treatment differences were
ccounted for by looking at a set of exogenous demographics (age,
ender, university location) and other exogenous personal vari-
bles (has a PhD, obtained PhD in Italy vs. abroad, which subﬁeld
f Chemistry does the person belong). We  calculated an individ-
al propensity score of patenting as the predicted coefﬁcient of a
robit estimate in which the probability of experiencing the event
epended only on the two sets of covariates.6
We  then paired each inventor to the scholar whose propensity
core was more proximal by means of a one-to-one nearest-
eighbour matching procedure without replacement. Under a
easonably strict Calliper (Cochran and Rubin, 1973) of 0.70, we
ropped four academic inventors because there was  no good match
vailable and another four were dropped for name disambiguation
oncerns. The ﬁnal matched pairs had a mean difference proba-
ility of 19.52% (standard deviation 0.24), indicating a satisfactory
atching Calliper of 0.67. The ﬁnal group of scholars for which we
erform the network analysis is composed of 106 scientists, evenly
plit between inventors and controls.
It is important to clarify that we intentionally avoided using
ariables based on publication when predicting propensity scores.
ince our links are based on co-authorship in articles, forcing
atching on article-related measures would cause selection on
hose variables that we wish to observe later in the network
nalysis. In other words, it would cause endogeneity of our observ-
bles due to selection. Rather, we chose to include predictors that
re exogenous to our network measures, but are good predic-
ors of productivity of publications. As we will see in the next
ub-sections, this strategy works fairly well. In fact the paired indi-
iduals result to have very similar productivity and co-authorship
ecords.
.3. Construction of the social networks
We  begin with two sets of egos, each composed of 53 scien-
ists. Ego-network data require three elements to be determined:
he egos, in our case the 106 academic inventors and controls; the
lters, in our case all the individuals with which one of the egos
either an inventor or a control) co-authored their papers within
 certain time frame; and ﬁnally, a measure of ego-alter relation-
hips, in our case the co-publication frequency – i.e., the number
f articles co-authored by egos and alters (Wasserman and Faust,
994, p. 42).
Alters were identiﬁed by retrieving the scientiﬁc publications of
ll egos listed in the Scopus database within a moving window of 11
ears. This time period varies for each individual and is centred on
he year of patent priority for each inventor and the same year for
he inventor’s matched control. Inventors start to be observed ﬁve
ears before the invention7 and are observed for ﬁve years after the
nvention, which gives an 11-year window of observation. Controls
re observed over the same time window of their paired inventor.
6 The probit estimate was  omitted for brevity, but is available upon request.
7 This is the patent priority year. Please note that in Italy, as well as within the
uropean Patent Ofﬁce countries, the inventors are required to ﬁle a patent applica-
ion before disclosing the invention in any form. This results in quick patent ﬁling.
atent ﬁling and priority hence give a close and fairly good approximation of the
iming of an invention. 42 (2013) 1378– 1388
Name matching is a challenging endeavour in most publication-
based research and presents peculiar issues for collecting network
data. To make sure that listed authors were consistently the same
person, we  controlled for homonyms and common names. Addi-
tionally, for each individual in our sample we checked afﬁliation
data, publication subject and consistency between the time of pub-
lication and the age of the scientist. However, while these checks
could be performed on the focal sample of inventors and non-
inventors (egos), we could not run the same checks on all of their
co-authors (alters) due to a lack of knowledge of the attributes of
those individuals. To avoid generating unreliable network data for
alters, we base our data collection on the latest release of Elsevier
Scopus, which tracks individuals by their author identiﬁers, rather
than by ﬁrst and last name (or last name and initial).8 These are
unique numerical author-IDs assigned by Scopus after a process
of name disambiguation. Ultimately, we use this information to
identify all authors in our sample and match them to publications’
IDs.
We  began our data collection with manual searches using the
names and surnames of our 106 focal authors. A database was
compiled to match authors’ names with the corresponding Scopus
author-ID. Using the author-IDs of co-authors we  then retrieved all
the publications of the alters and the author-IDs of the co-authors
of the alters. This methodological choice raises the caveat that our
analysis will generate unbiased results only to the extent that biases
and mistakes in the assignation of author-IDs by Elsevier Scopus
should apply randomly to both the alters of the inventors and to
those of their controls. Fortunately, this circumstance is likely to be
satisﬁed.
The publications of all egos in the time windows of observa-
tion resulted in a total of 4971 articles written by the egos along
with 6871 co-authors.9 Building on this ﬁrst set of authors, we
retrieve via author-IDs the publications of the 6871 alters. This
step is required to take into account possible direct connections
between the alters that do not involve the egos. Failing to do so
would produce seriously biased network indicators, based only on
a small fraction of the underlying data.
At this point, our dataset contains 283,280 scientiﬁc articles
written by a total of 9997 authors. Since we limit our study to a
moving window of 11 years (centred on the year of patent priority
for an inventor and the same year for its matched control), after
slicing and dicing data outside of the relevant windows, our ﬁnal
dataset contains a total of 59,457 articles and 6157 authors. This
breaks down into 1927 publications authored by the 53 inventors
along with their 3057 co-authors, 1824 by the 53 controls along
with 3303 co-authors and 55,659 articles published by 4486 co-
authors of either inventors and controls that do not include the 53
inventors nor the 53 controls. Inventors and controls shared 297
co-authors and were co-authors in 54 papers (co-authored with
106 common co-authors).
We  divided this matrix into 4 sub-matrixes mapping the con-
nections of inventors and controls, before and after their ﬁrst
patent application. These matrixes include direct and indirect co-
authorship ties for all the egos and all direct ties of the alters. We
used Pajek to convert each 2-mode matrix (author-by-publication)
into a 1-mode one (author-by-author) where each intersection con-
tains the number of publications in common between any dyad of
8 We  are grateful to the Elsevier–Scopus team for custom data-retrieval and assis-
tance with the use of author’s identiﬁers.
9 Between 1982 and 2006, 54 publications were jointly co-authored by inven-
tors and controls, 2581 articles were written by the 53 inventors along with 2947
co-authors and 2444 were published by the controls along with 4333 co-authors.
Inventors and controls shared 410 co-authors.
E. Forti et al. / Research Policy 42 (2013) 1378– 1388 1383
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the ﬁnal sample (106 Obs.).
Variable Mean: inventors Mean: non-inventors
Year of birth 1952 1950
(9.48) (9.26)
Dummy  age: 35–45 0.24 0.2
(0.43) (0.4)
Dummy  age: 46–55 0.29 0.29
(0.46) (0.46)
Dummy  age: 56–65 0.33 0.36
(0.47) (0.49)
Dummy  age: over 65 0.15 0.15
(0.36) (0.36)
Gender 0.78 0.89
(0.42) (0.32)
Geographic location: north 0.51 0.58
(0.51) (0.5)
Geographic
location: centre
0.33 0.2
(0.47) (0.4)
Geographic location: south 0.16 0.22
(0.37) (0.42)
Phd 0.35 0.24
(0.48) (0.43)
Phd in Italy 0.33 0.22
(0.47) (0.42)
Phd Abroad 0.02 0.02
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Table 2
Pre- and post-patent between- and within-group differences.
Time Obs. Mean Standard
deviation
Min  Max
Inventors
Publications Before 53 15.22 14.25 0 71
Publications After 53 30.19 33.23 0 161
Authors per paper Before 616 5.43 2.49 1 20
Authors per paper After 1421 6.01 4.50 1 71
Size  Before 53 22.49 23.13 0 126
Size After 53 53.77 51.37 6.00 307
Norm. betweenness Before 53 33.99 25.38 0 84.21
Norm. betweenness After 53 47.92 23.73 0 88.69
Norm. brokerage Before 53 0.52 0.33 0 0.92
Norm. brokerage After 53 0.73 0.23 0 0.96
Density Before 53 32.98 28.25 0 100
Density After 53 27.25 22.52 3.65 100
Constraint Before 53 0.27 0.22 0 0.97
Constraint After 53 0.23 0.15 0.04 0.64
Controls
Publications Before 53 15.48 11.01 0 51
Publications After 53 24.35 18.13 0 81
Authors per paper Before 650 5.43 2.36 1 23
Authors per paper After 1264 6.00 2.65 1 17
Size  Before 53 24.58 24.12 0 114
Size After 53 50.66 40.40 0 213
Norm. betweenness Before 53 39.91 27.81 0 88.29
Norm. betweenness After 53 51.50 20.97 0 85.28
Norm. brokerage Before 53 0.56 0.33 0 0.94
Norm. brokerage After 53 0.76 0.19 0 0.95
Density Before 53 23.24 20.06 0 100
Density After 53 21.92 16.35 0 100(0.14) (0.14)
tandard error in parentheses.
uthors. Network indicators for inventors and controls were ﬁnally
omputed using UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al., 2002).
.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 gives an account of the characteristics of the egos split
etween the two samples of inventors and non-inventors. Around
2% of the scientists sampled are between 35 and 45 years old.
onsistently with studies on age and productivity, this age class
xhibits the peak of productivity. In agreement with the country-
evel age distribution of university professors, 34% are rather senior
56 years old or older). The majority of the scientists sampled work
n the north of the country, less than 20% work in the south, and
he remaining are based in central Italy. This distribution is again
onsistent with the geographical distribution of universities in the
ountry. About one-third of the scientists have a PhD, while the
ajority have a second-level university degree. Again, this is con-
istent with the age proﬁle when considering that PhD programmes
ere ﬁrst introduced in Italy in 1984 and full training abroad was
uite unusual in the seventies.
.5. Network indicators
General statistics of the indicators computed for the two sam-
les – inventors and controls – separately before and after the year
f their ﬁrst patent application are reported in Table 2. Before the
ocal year, inventors and controls have approximately the same
roductivity (15.2 vs. 15.5 publications). The number of co-authors
er paper is also very much the same (5.43). This additionally reas-
ures us on the effectiveness of our matching procedure.10We  characterize individual networks by ﬁve properties: size,
ensity,  betweenness centrality, constraint and brokerage.  First, a net-
ork’s size grows with the total number of individuals directly
10 Note that in our construction of the data the sample of inventors and controls
re drawn from populations of different sizes. The fact that our chosen controls are
nly very productive individuals mitigates the potential problems caused by exclud-
ng  the null relationships in a true global matrix (virtually composed of all Italian
cientists in chemistry). We  appreciate the comments of an anonymous reviewer
hat we  provide more information about this approach.Constraint Before 53 0.22 0.20 0 1.05
Constraint After 53 0.20 0.15 0.04 0.83
related to each other even without the mediating role of the rele-
vant ego. Accordingly, we  measure size to evaluate the dimension of
the community to which a scientist belongs. The size of a network is
computed by counting the number of nodes (Wasserman and Faust,
1994). Since each scientist can deploy limited resources and capa-
bilities for building and maintaining ties, network size becomes a
useful indicator to assess the structure of scientists’ relations. Sec-
ond, networks where all logically possible ties are actually present
are empirically rare. Therefore, it is useful to look at how close a
network is to realizing this potential – that is, to examine its den-
sity (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). A network’s density relates to
the intensity of the relationship linking the authors based on the
frequency of their interactions. Since overall density is affected by
network size, we compute a standardized measure of density – the
relative network density – instead of an absolute density (Friedkin,
1981).
Third, investigating the division of scientists into groups and
sub-structures as well as redundancies in scientists’ connections
may  have important implications for the social dynamics of sci-
entiﬁc communities. For instance, when colleagues connected to
a focal scientist are not themselves connected to one another, a
brokerage opportunity exists for the focal scientist. Burt deﬁnes
“structural holes” as non-redundant relationships among actors
and describes the use of a measure of constraint to formally evalu-
ate whether an actor’s network is rich or poor in structural holes by
capturing the extent to which an actor’s “time and energy are con-
centrated in a single group of interconnected colleagues – which
means no access to structural holes” Burt (2010, p. 294).
The constraint indicator has been validated by Burt (e.g., 1992,
2004) and other scholars in a variety of empirical contexts (e.g., Lee,
2009). Constraint captures the degree to which an ego enhances
the cohesion among sub-groups of a network and is expressed as
a negative value. The greater is the opportunity for a scientist to
act as a bridge among subgroups (that may  themselves be more or
less densely knit), the lower will be the constraint indicator. We
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Table 3
Summary of variables and data sources.
Variable Description Formula
Size Size reﬂects the number of ties ego has and is generally computed by counting the number of
individual nodes. In our case is computed as the number of individual co-authors x of the focal
scientist i plus the scientist i itself (Wasserman and Faust, 1994)
Si = xi + 1
Density Networks where all logically possible ties are actually present are empirically rare. It is useful to
look at how close a network is to realizing this potential. That is, to examine its density. The
network density of a scientist i is measured as the ratio between the lines that are actually present
in  scientist i’s ego network (Li) and the maximum number of lines that can be present g(g − 1)/2
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p. 101)
i = 2Lig(g−1)
Normalized betweenness Nodes that occur on many shortest paths between other vertices have higher betweenness than
those that do not. Betweenness centrality is deﬁned for each node k as the share of times that a
node  i needs a node k in order to reach a node j via the shortest path. Speciﬁcally, gij is the number
of geodesic paths from i to j, and gikj is the number of these geodesics that pass through node k. We
normalize the betweenness indicator dividing simple betweenness by its maximum value
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Borgatti, 2005)
Bk =
∑
i
∑
j
gikj
gij
, i /= j /= k
Constraint The network constraint of i captures redundancies in a scientist’s connections where pij is the
proportion of time and energy that ego i invested in ego j (piq and pqj are deﬁned analogously).
Hence, the network constraint of i is the proportion of ego i’s relationship that are invested in
connection with ego j. Lower values on this indicator imply that scientist i occupies a less
constrained position, thereby brokering more extensively in the network (Burt, 1992; Lee, 2009)
Ci =
∑
j
(
pij +
∑
q /=  i /= j
piqpqi
)2
Normalized brokerage When the actors participating in a focal scientist’s ego network are not connected directly to one
another, the ego may  be a broker if she/he is the only intermediary between a pair of actors. Since
we  are interested in measuring how many times pairs of actors in a scientist’s network are not
directly connected (i.e., the number of paths on which the focal scientist lies) we compute a
scientist j’s absolute brokerage following the method developed by Gould and Fernandez (1989, p.
101,  Eq. (2)). We  normalize this indicator by dividing the total brokerage score tj by the number of
orgat
ly int
tj = b0j + bi0j + b0Ij + w0j + wIj
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ment in terms of number of publications and number of co-authors
per paper (Table 4, left). Recall that our propensity score match-
ing was not based on publication measures, to avoid issues of
11 Gould and Fernandez’s (1989) approach to brokerage allows to measure the
absolute brokerage capacity of an actor and to further differentiate between ﬁvepairs  that can be present in scientist j’s network (B
indicator imply that scientist j is frequently the on
ompute constraint scores for each inventor and non-inventor in
ur sample before and after patenting to assess changes in the level
f cohesion that a scientist brings in her network. The measures
re computed for all nodes in the network, treating each one as ego
nd considering the ego network as if the rest of the network did
ot exist, so that ties beyond alters have no effect. Hence we  only
onsider alter–alter ties as originally suggested by Burt (2004).
Fourth, betweenness centrality measures are used to character-
ze the position of an ego within its own network and to assess the
trength with which the individual acts as an intermediary in the
irculation of information (Freeman, 1991; Borgatti, 2005). Central-
ty increases when the individual is a necessary link connecting two
airs of nodes from a larger network (Borgatti, 2005). Technically,
nformation centrality indexes are based on the geodesic distance
etween actors and measure the shortest path connecting a pair
f actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The more an individual
ays between others on their geodesics, the greater her importance
n keeping the nodes in contact. We  normalize the betweenness
ndicator by dividing simple betweenness by its maximum value.
Finally, in line with the work of other innovation scholars
Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Nerkar and Paruchuri, 2005; Lissoni,
010), we compute brokerage to further characterize a scientist’s
osition in its knowledge network. Complementing the informa-
ion offered by betweenness centrality, the value of a brokering
osition stems from the relative redundancy of network ties. The
ntuition is that scientists have different gains from connecting
o colleagues who are already in connection through others as
pposed to connecting with colleagues who would otherwise be
isconnected (Gould and Fernandez, 1989). Scientists acting as bro-
ers can bridge gaps in the social fabric of science by helping and/or
xploiting the ﬂow of information and opportunities (Burt, 2004).
s little or no new information becomes available through redun-
ant ties, scientists who act as the only intermediary between
airs of colleagues can beneﬁt from a superior network position
or inventive activities (Lee, 2009; Fleming et al., 2007; Stovel and
haw, 2012). Since we are interested in measuring the number of
aths on which the focal scientist lies we characterize a scientist’sti et al., 2002). Higher values on this
ermediary between two  other actors
absolute brokerage following the method developed by Gould and
Fernandez (1989).11 Table 3 reports all these measures and how
they are computed
4. Empirical analysis
Our analysis is based on paired-tests. We  want to test the
null hypothesis that the mean difference of the observed variable
between each paired-sample equals zero. In order to do so, in
this and in all subsequent comparisons, we take the following
approach: for normally distributed paired differences, a simple
T-test was  performed under the null hypothesis of zero mean
difference of the variable. Because the distribution of paired dif-
ferences sometimes is skewed in important ways, we  performed
a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, where the null hypothesis is that the
sum of paired differences obeyed a normal distribution with the
mean equal to the variance. This is equivalent to testing whether
or not the values of the variables in the two  samples have a similar
distribution. Normality is evaluated with the Shapiro–Wilk test.
We  look at between and within group comparisons. The
between-group comparisons highlight differences between inven-
tors and controls. Recall that paired samples are meant to remove
the effects of confounding variables (age, gender, geographic loca-
tion, PhD) that would otherwise concur to cause differences in the
indicators of inventors and controls. In fact, as we desired, the
inventors and controls do not statistically differ before the treat-types of brokers (liaisons, itinerants, coordinators, gatekeepers, and representatives)
corresponding to different triadic conﬁgurations of actors and intermediaries. In our
paper we  are simply interested in measuring the extent to which a scientist’s role is
that of a broker, therefore, we characterize brokerage for each focal scientist using
Gould and Fernandez’s absolute brokerage score.
E. Forti et al. / Research Policy 42 (2013) 1378– 1388 1385
Table 4
Differences and signiﬁcance.
Variable Between groups Within groups
(Inventors vs. controls) (After vs. before)
5 years before patent 5 years after patent Inventors Controls
Publications −0.47 6.21 17.26 11.53
(1.50) (3.67)* (4.96)* (3.00)*
Authors per paper 0.37 −4.69 19.42 24.49
(0.31) (5.42) (0.33)* (5.43)*
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ttandard error in parentheses.
* p < 0.05.
ndogeneity. The fact that our paired individuals exhibit similar
roductivity is a further conﬁrmation that our predictors worked
ell at identifying fairly similar controls. Suppose for example that
nventors are exceptionally good scientists; the matching proce-
ure would work to pair these individuals with another set of
xceptionally good scientists, although with no patent, rather than
n just an average group of scientists. In line with prior evidence
Azoulay et al., 2009; Calderini et al., 2009), our results also conﬁrm
hat the inventors published more than the controls after patenting.
The within-group comparisons highlight differences between
he pre and the post patent period within the subgroup of inventors
nd controls separately. As stated before, we should be aware that
ost of the indicators of scientiﬁc performance tend to grow over
ime, consistent with the life cycle effect (the scientists in our sam-
le are on average 53 and therefore experience monotonic growth
n average). Here we use the same time-window for inventors and
ontrols to account for the potentially confounding effect of time
nd life-cycle in inﬂating the values of the indicators as the scien-
ist ages. In fact, as we expect, both groups of scientists experience
ncrease in the number of articles published over time (Table 4,
ight). Note also that both groups experience an increase of co-
uthors. This evidence can be explained in part by life-cycle effects,
nd in part by the general trend towards expanding research teams
bserved in recent years (Adams et al., 2005; Wuchty et al., 2007).
hatever the reason, we want to test our hypotheses net of this
mpact. Therefore we wish to explore whether inventors experi-
nce a change in the network structure and position that could not
ust be explained by the effect of time.
.1. Relational capital and ego position before patenting
In Table 5 we report the results of the tests performed between
roups, i.e., inventors versus controls, relative to the network
imension, position and ego-network structure of our scientists.
he positive sign indicates that inventors exhibit a higher value
f the indicator and the negative sign indicate that the controls
xhibit a higher value of the indicator. In the ﬁrst raw of the table
e see that inventors have slightly smaller networks than controls
rior to inventing, although the difference is not statistically
igniﬁcant. In general, contrary to the prediction of H1, inventors
able 5
ifferences and signiﬁcance – between groups.
Variable (Inventors minus controls)
5 years before patent 5 years after patent
Size −2.09 (3.10) 3.11 (6.06) 
Betweenness (normalized) −5.92 (4.03)*   −3.58 (4.13) 
Brokerage (normalized) −0.04 (0.04)  −0.03 (0.03)*  
Density 9.74 (4.62)* 5.34 (3.81)
Constraint 0.02 (0.04)  −0.11 (0.03)*  
tandard error in parentheses. : non-normally distributed; Kolgomorov–Smirnov
est.
* p < 0.05.and non-inventors were immersed in networks of similar size prior
than the focal year. Network dimension is therefore not likely to be
associated to a greater propensity to produce inventions, at least
in our sample.
In the second and third row of Table 5 we  report the average dif-
ference in the indicators of network structure in terms of centrality
and brokerage of inventors and controls. Here, we observe that the
inventors were less central in their networks than non-inventors
prior to patenting (they exhibit a lower betweeness centrality than
controls and a comparable level of brokerage). We therefore ﬁnd no
support to our H2 of a positive association of the inventive activity
and a more central or more brokering position towards otherwise
disconnected nodes.
In the third and forth row of Table 5 we  report the mean
difference values for the ego-network indicators of density and
constraints. Here we see that inventors’ ego-networks were more
cohesive than the ego-networks of non-inventors, a circumstance
that is highlighted by a superior density,  with virtually the same
level of constraint.  This evidence supports our H3a that denser
networks might be associated to greater inventive capacity, pos-
sibly because frequent and redundant connections enhance the
exchange of ﬁne-grained information, and/or promote trust, coop-
eration and learning among the network participants.
In conclusion, when we  compare inventors and controls prior
to the event of patenting, we ﬁnd no clear differences concerning
network dimension, and network position. We  do ﬁnd evidence
that, prior to patenting, inventors were immersed in denser, more
cohesive networks than non-inventors. In other words the inven-
tors and their co-authors were more likely to be interconnected
among each other with multiple ties than the controls.
4.2. Relational capital and ego position after patenting
Scientiﬁc performance is strongly dependent on life and career
effects (Levin and Stephan, 1991). Furthermore, a general trend of
increasing cooperation in science has been documented in recent
years (Adams et al., 2005; Wuchty et al., 2007). Hence, comparing
measures derived from scientiﬁc outcomes (articles published, cita-
tions, co-authorship) in a certain period against similar measures
derived from scientiﬁc outcomes at a later period can be mislead-
ing and result in spurious correlations. In this paper we mitigate
this risk by comparing the indicators calculated in different time
periods in light of the within groups differences (Table 6). Within
group differences highlight the growth of the indicators over time
within the group of the inventors and within the group of the paired
controls separately.
In Table 6, a positive sign of the inventor’s value means that after
patenting the indicator is higher than prior to patenting. A negative
sign means that after patenting the value is lower. Similarly, for the
controls, the positive sign means that over time the indicator has
increased and a negative sign means that over time the indicator
has decreased. The top row of the table shows that both the inven-
tors and the controls increase their network dimension (size) over
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Table 6
Difference and signiﬁcance – within groups.
Variable (After minus before)
Inventors Controls
Size 31.28 (5.16)*   25.22 (3.98) 
Betweenness (normalized) 13.93 (3.63)*   11.44 (3.57)*  
Brokerage (normalized) 0.21 (0.04)*   0.20 (0.04)*  
Density −5.73 (4.79) −1.36 (2.93)
Constraint −0.05 (0.21)*   −0.02 (0.23) 
Standard error in parentheses. : non-normally distributed; Kolgomorov–Smirnov
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ownership of the professors themselves) complement publicationest.
* p < 0.05.
ime. We  saw in the prior section that inventors had slightly smaller
etworks than controls prior to patent. When we look at the same
ifference 5 years after patent (Table 5, right panel), we  appreci-
te that inventors network size over time have levelled-off and in
act it is now slightly larger than the network size of the controls,
lthough the difference is still not statistically signiﬁcant.
The second and third row of Table 5 (right panel) show that
nventors, who were in general less central prior to inventing, after
atenting lay in positions more similar than those of the controls.
hen we look at the differences within (Table 6), again we see a
eneral tendency of both types of individuals to become more cen-
ral in their networks and act more as brokers as the time passes.
his is consistent to common wisdom. Although our data cannot
bserve directly so, we presume that individuals progress in their
areer, create or expand their lab and group of PhD students and
ost-docs and these changes result in greater network centrality
nd more brokerage in networks. However the interesting thing
s that over time the inventors, who were more peripheral prior
o patenting, partially catch-up to non-inventors, so that in the
ftermath of patents there’s no substantial difference among inven-
ors and controls concerning their network centrality (Table 5, right
anel). Conversely, as the time passes, both inventors and con-
rols become less necessary in their networks to connect nodes
hat would otherwise be disconnected, as witnessed by evidence
f decreasing brokerage (Table 6). There is evidence that inventors
ct less as a broker of relationships than non-inventors in the post-
atenting period, but this difference is very small in magnitude and
nly weakly signiﬁcant (Table 5, right panel). In general, we ﬁnd no
upport for either H4a or Hypotheses 4a or 4b that patenting is
ssociated to important alterations in the network structure of the
cademics.
We now move on to considering ego-network position. Recall
hat, consistently with Hypothesis 3a, inventors tended to have
ore cohesive networks before patenting. We  therefore investi-
ate Hypothesis 5a, which would consider less dense and more
onstrained networks as evidence of a deterioration in ego-network
tructure in the post-invention period. We  see that over time inven-
ors expand their connections by establishing new relationships
ore markedly than non-inventors, so that the size of the net-
ork increases, with a comparable intensity of relations (density).
hey however become more likely to act as cohesive forces in
heir network, by connecting subgroups of otherwise disconnected
lters. This tendency is visible from the lower network constraint
Table 5, right), which captures the degree to which ties are redun-
ant within a network. We  see from Table 6 that network constraint
ends to decrease with time in both groups, but the decrease regis-
ered in the group of the inventors is sharper so that, after patenting,
nventors are less constrained than controls. Therefore we ﬁnd no
upport for the deterioration Hypothesis formulated in 5a.In general, the broader evidence points towards denying that
nventorship deteriorates the knowledge generation capacity of
he networks of academic inventors. None of the evidence we 42 (2013) 1378– 1388
have provided shows that after patenting inventors become more
peripheral or secluded form the scientiﬁc community.
5. Conclusions
We  investigated the co-authorship networks of academic inven-
tors prior and after patenting. Because there are clear effects of
life-cycle and trend that make inventors more productive over time
and more central in their communities, comparing measures based
on the publications of a group of scientists over time may cause spu-
rious associations. To overcome this problem, our research strategy
was  to assemble a paired sample of scientists who have never
obtained a patent and use this sample as a benchmark group. The
assumption is that the control group would be affected by life-cycle
and trend effects in ways similar to those affecting the inventors.
We would therefore interpret as signiﬁcant not the levels or the
variations (higher or lower) of a certain indicator over time, but
the differences between the levels of the inventor group against its
target. Comparability across the samples was  achieved by means
of a one-to-one pair-matching strategy based on the estimation of
a propensity score. The latter was  made to depend only on pre-
determined and exogenous variables. The sample we  used offers
multiple advantages, including being geographically conﬁned and
disciplinarily homogeneous.
Overall, we  did not ﬁnd support for our hypotheses that
inventive activities are associated with a broader network in the
pre-invention phase or with a more central and brokering position
of the inventors. The networks of the inventors were of comparable
size to those of the controls prior and after patenting and inventors
were in fact even slightly more peripheral in their networks than
controls. Inventors were conversely found to be in denser networks
with more redundant links than those of non-inventors. Our  results
suggest a positive correlation of denser networks and inventor-
ship, but do not imply causality. Based on the contributions of the
knowledge generation capacity of networks, we can state that a
positive association might be consistent with the view that denser
networks are more useful in conveying ﬁne-grained information
and in promoting trust and learning among nodes.
We also studied the network dimension, network position and
ego networks of the inventors in the period that follows the inven-
tion of a patent, to inquire whether inventions are associated with
alterations in the knowledge generation capacity of networks, with
a speciﬁc focus on looking for any evidence of increased separation
of the inventors from the academic community. The evidence we
show points at denying any hypothesis of separation or isolation of
academic inventors. We  saw that in the years after patenting, inven-
tors keep extending their networks particularly towards otherwise
disconnected subgroups. We  see this evidence as complementary
to prior studies of social networks of academic inventors (Lissoni,
2010; Toole and Czarnitzki, 2010).
6. Limitations and avenues for future research
Our work presents some limitations. First, we  observe only
inventors of patents assigned to their respective universities of afﬁl-
iation. We  are aware from previous studies (Balconi et al., 2004,
Breschi et al., 2008) that this is not the prevailing invention strategy
in Italy. While most studies focusing on the possible rivalry between
academic patenting and publishing patterns do not ﬁnd support for
such trade-off, Czarnitzki et al. (2009) using a German sample show
that patents assigned to non-proﬁt organizations (incl. individualquantity and quality, whereas patents assigned to corporations
are negatively related to quantity and quality of publication
output.
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Second, we broadly considered patent applications ﬁled in dif-
erent countries. We  are aware that this approach might not control
or the heterogeneity regarding the number of countries covered
y a patent, as well as the different ﬁling strategies. Future studies
hould investigate further in this direction and explore the differ-
nces, if any, in the corresponding social network structures.
More generally, as is often the case in social network analysis,
ccurate sampling at the individual level might not necessarily lead
o stronger external validity with respect to the network results.
his is particularly true when, as in our case, one looks at longitudi-
al data. While we followed all of the standard procedures normally
sed in these cases and normalized all indexes and deﬁned com-
arable network structures over the different time intervals, some
roblems with the computation of the different indexes may  still
emain. This reasoning also led us to explicitly rely on a limited
umber of indicators that have been proven to be less sensitive to
omputational problems.
An additional problem relates to the possible presence of direct
nd indirect links of inventors with the treatment group. While
e cannot rule out completely this potential source of bias, we
an reassure the reader that, if a bias exists, it is indeed extremely
imited. Inventors and non-inventors jointly co-authored the 1.1%
54) of their papers. Common co-authors account for 1.6% (106)
f total coauthors, while common acquaintances – collaborations
mong co-authors – account for 3.1% (191).
Name matching is source of potential bias in most publication-
nd patent-based research, and it is particularly challenging in
ocial network analysis, where the number of acquaintances scale-
p at the power law. To minimize the incidence of mismatching
e relied on Scopus’ numerical identiﬁers – assigned directly by
copus, after running disambiguation algorithms – to retrieve pub-
ications for our focal scientists and all of their co-authors. As these
echniques become more precise and widely available, more exten-
ive analysis could be performed to verify the robustness of our
ndings.
Finally, to distinguish between inventor and non-inventors we
elied on a self reported indication of the latters. While there were
o reason to deny inventorship when asked and indeed several oth-
rs responding to the questionnaire used did so although they were
ever listed as inventors in Academic patents, we could formally
ule out only that our controls were not listed as inventors in Italian
cademic patents.
Despite these shortcomings, we believe that our paper offers a
nique and original contribution to the debate about the charac-
eristics and behaviour of academic inventors. Future work should
xtend our comparative analyses to include multivariate modelling
f social network structure in the immediacy of the inventing event.
t should also extend the investigation to more scientiﬁc disciplines
nd to different institutional environments.
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